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In Pursuit of Another Conversation: 
Social Justice as Educational Discussion 
 
KANAKO IDE 
Faculty of Education, Soka University 
 
This paper explores a point of discussion between the views expressed in lectures by Paul 
Standish and Yasuo Imai. Although they initially share the same scepticism about the 
contemporary educational discourse concerning social justice, their philosophical 
deliberations seem ultimately to diverge. With reference to the works of Minoru Murai, this 
paper explores the foundational questions that Imai and Standish have in common 
throughout their arguments. To begin this bridging process, I will first create an imaginary 
conversation between Imai and Murai about justice and violence in education. After that, I 
will examine how Murai would engage with Standish on the matter of social justice in 
educational studies. At the end of the paper, I will discuss a way to integrate at the 




INTRODUCTION: ANOTHER PARTICIPANT IN CONVERSATION  
 
Two international conferences entitled Culture and Subjectivity in Translation at Kyoto University 
and Translation and the Understanding of Other Cultures at the University of Tokyo in December 
2011 invited the present author to deliberate on two philosophical issues: (1) Social Justice in 
Educational Research, and (2) Violence in Education. At these conferences, these issues were 
specifically addressed by two outstanding contemporary educational philosophers, Paul Standish and 
Yasuo Imai. In this article, I attempt to develop the philosophical conversations between Standish and 
Imai. To do so, I wish to draw another contemporary Japanese philosopher, Minoru Murai, into the 
debate. Murai’s philosophical framework contributes to the elucidation of the philosophical 
conversation for two reasons. First, Murai has an interest in this topic in common with Standish and 
Imai. Murai assumes that the issue of social justice is so important that the usage of the term ‘social 
justice’ ‘does bear some critical examination’ (Standish 2012, p. 17). In particular, Murai shares with 
Imai and Standish the assumption that, if we want to understand the phenomena, we have to pay 
some attention ‘to the nature of the language itself’ (p. 19), and to ‘experience a difference between 
semantic fields’ (p. 21).  
  Second, Murai’s discussion connects Imai’s argument to Standish’s. Imai explains that his 
argument ‘shares skepticism about a certain concept of “justice” with the keynote speech of Prof. 
Standish’ (Imai, 2011, p. 1). As their arguments develop, however, their philosophical foci seem to be 
different. For example, Standish says that ‘there is a continuing need to be sensitized to the rhetorical 
inflation of this and similar terms’ (Standish, 2012, p. 25). Standish makes the critical remark that 
because of the rhetorical correctness of the sound of the term ‘social justice’, some educational 
researchers have taken advantage of the term to justify their research. As a result, Standish points out 
that its theoretical background marks a distance from ‘certain central aspects of education’ (ibid.). 
Furthermore, for Standish, social justice as an educational issue is affected by the unbalanced 
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relationship between Orientalism and Occidentalism when the term ‘social justice’ is translated from 
one language to another:  
 
This, I think, reinforces the bad aspects of policy-borrowing and reduces the possibilities of 
exchange between countries. At the same time it foregrounds shukan-teki ways of thinking and 
being at the expense of the greater openness and possibility of the shutai-teki (pp. 24-25).  
 
Here, his focus transfers to a word concerning subjectivity, which is translatable both as shukan and 
shutai in Japanese. Standish explains the difference between shukan and shutai as follows:  
 
In popular terms shukan can have negative associations related to a kind of lack of 
objectivity, to being too subjective in one’s consideration of things, or perhaps being too 
egotistical… shutai by contrast, a term less visible in philosophy as it was then established in 
Japan, can imply a kind of independence of thought, or perhaps better a self-reliance or 
resourcefulness, such that one is not too easily influenced by others (pp. 22-23).  
 
For Standish, it is against the character of the term ‘social justice’, if what is referred to by this term in 
the process of crossing different languages and cultures causes us not recognise subjectivity as 
shutai-teki.  
  In contrast, Imai’s discussion of justice is focused on educational violence drawing on Walter 
Benjamin’s theoretical framework. Imai says:  
 
Educational violence, though it is self-positing and even ‘expiatory’, always remains 
violence. Thus education has structural difficulties in justifying itself in the sense of 
accountability. Within the field of education, educational violence appears to be immune 
to any criticism because of its self-positing and law-free structure. Precisely because of this 
structure, educational violence suffers from a fatal incapacity to justify itself, once it is asked 
for its accountability from outside the field of education. This apparently is the situation 
with which present-day educational violence is forced to be confronted (Imai, 2011, p. 3).  
 
For Imai, the matter of justice in education is a serious philosophical question because, as Benjamin 
discussed, violence is unavoidable in education. Therefore, Imai’s philosophical concern is about 
whether a discussion of justice in education can be consistent with the features of education (which 
commonly include certain types of violence).  
  As described above, these philosopher’s arguments on the same topic are so distinctive that it seems 
to be difficult to find a point of philosophical agreement. In order to find a point of interaction 
between Imai’s and Standish’s arguments, it is necessary to find a line of thought that can act as a 
bridge between them. I believe that Murai is qualified to act as such because his idea is ‘a digression’ 
(Standish, 2012, p. 17). Here, ‘digression’ means that Murai’s perspective allows Imai’s and 
Standish’s arguments to go back to the subject in question: education. To begin this bridging process 
in the next section, I first create an imaginary conversation between Imai and Murai about justice and 
violence in education. 
 
 
EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION 
 
In this section, I explore how Murai would respond to the issue of educational violence as it is 
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discussed by Imai. Murai’s argument about the issue of violence in education is equivalent to the 
discussion of the definition of the term ‘education’. Specifically, it differentiates education from 
indoctrination. Richard Gatchel examines the relationship between these two words in the West from 
a historical perspective. According to him, during the medieval period in Europe, there was no 
distinction between indoctrination and education because the purpose of educational institutions was 
simply to implant Christian doctrine. Gatchel says: ‘Since about the seventeenth century, increasing 
expression of and experimentation with concepts of democracy have brought with them considerably 
different ideas about education’ (Gatchel, 1972, p. 11). The distinction between indoctrination and 
education becomes a live issue with the development of the idea of democracy. Since individuals have 
the right to make decisions in a democratic society, they are required to be deliberative, creative, and 
critical, rather than merely being passive to authority. As a result of shifting the image of the ideal 
society, the social expectations concerning education were also changed. The meaning of 
indoctrination was changed from being synonymous with education to becoming the antithesis of 
education.  
  There are two major strands of thought regarding the issue of indoctrination. First, in Western 
society, the issue of indoctrination in education was comprehensively discussed, especially in the 
1970s, by applying analytic philosophical methodology. In general, analytic philosophers are 
interested in mapping out the semantic border between education and indoctrination (Snook, 1972). 
For them, it is important to define what education is and what indoctrination is, because they believe 
that indoctrination should be avoided. Second, there are two major reasons to debate the issue of 
indoctrination: ideological influences and religious indoctrinations (Snook, 1970). Ideological 
indoctrination is meant to brainwash people into accepting a particular ideology (e.g. Communism in 
the previous century), and religious indoctrination is meant to implant extreme religious attitudes. 
  Murai’s interest in discussing justice and violence in education is to reflect on these arguments in 
Japanese social contexts. For Murai, the problem is that the distinction between indoctrination and 
education has never been taken up as a serious subject for discussion for educational studies in Japan. 
According to Murai, kyouiku, widely translated as ‘education’ in contemporary Japanese society, is an 
imported word from China. The origin of kyouiku is The Mencius, a classic of Confucian philosophy. 
Although Japan has a long history of importing Confucian philosophy, including The Mencius, 
kyouiku was not commonly used to describe teaching or learning in Japanese society until the Meiji 
period (1868 to 1912) (Murai, 2005, pp. 29-30). Murai points out that at the beginning of the Meiji 
period, Toshimichi Ohkubo, who was employed to establish the modern school system in Japan, 
initially translated ‘education’ not as kyouiku but as kyouka, which means ‘indoctrination’ if directly 
translated from Japanese to English(ibid.). Murai explains that the term indoctrination is rather 
appropriate to express the actuality of the modern school system in Japan. This is because, according 
to Murai, the organization of the Japanese modern school system was designed to Westernize, 
industrialize, and modernize people and society by denying the uniqueness of Japanese culture 
(Murai, 2000, p. 15). Murai also demonstrates this tendency through the example of another 
translation problem in education. He points out that gimu-kyouiku in Japanese is currently translated 
as compulsory education. However, its original translation was kyousei-kyouiku or kyouhaku-kyouiku. 
The direct translation of kyousei-kyouiku in English is ‘forced education’ and kyouhaku-kyouiku in 
English is ‘threatened education’ (p. 22). Murai argues that even though kyouka was re-translated as 
kyouiku, and kyouhaku-kyouiku or kyousei-kyouiku was re-translated as gimu-kyouiku, original 
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translations clarify the content of modern school education in Japan. The point at issue for Murai is 
that changing the word from kyouka to kyouiku does not change the quality of the meaning suggested 
by the term. Thus, Japanese society has been using a term for ‘education’ that means indoctrination 
(Murai, 2005, p. 30). Here, Murai’s response to Imai’s discussion is clear. Murai agrees with Imai’s 
analysis that violence is unavoidable in education because the meaning of ‘education’ is historically 
distorted in educational discourse. If the content of the word ‘education’ contains ‘indoctrination’, 
then education can never be consistent with the idea of justice.  
  Imai is also concerned about another kind of educational violence besides that involved in 
schooling. For example, Imai points out the possibility of violence in child rearing. At the moment of 
teaching children some basic discipline, their parents can (and do) use violence in the name of 
education. These issues are, however, still examined whether it is education or indoctrination in the 





Next, I examine how Murai would engage with Standish on the matter of social justice in educational 
studies. Murai would do so by focusing on the examination of the character of educational studies. 
Murai’s concern is actually addressed in the very first sentence of Standish’s lecture: ‘ “Social justice” 
is a phrase that recurs with some force in contemporary political and academic discussion’ (Standish, 
2012, p. 17). In contrast with Standish’s argument, Murai discusses this issue from the 
macro-viewpoint. It means that Murai does not develop his philosophical argument in translation 
between languages. Instead, he deliberates issues in translation between academic disciplines. In other 
words, the matter of subjectivity is to be discussed as if educational studies were characterized as an 
independent academic discipline. Murai critically comments that since the modern educational 
system and its content have been controlled by social, political, and economic situations, educational 
studies has never established its own academic independence.  
  In Shintei Kyouiku kara no Minaoshi, Murai demonstrates how Education Studies has been 
parasitic on other academic disciplines and, as a result, how educational questions have been distorted 
and answered by political, economic, legal, or scientific viewpoints.1 Thus, Murai claims that one of 
the most important roles of the philosophy of education is to examine the inherent nature of 
educational thought by contrasting it with specifically political, economic, legal, and scientific 
thought about the same issues. It means that, for Murai, the foundational problem of the issue of 
social justice in education is whether or not educational questions are answered by a distinctively 
educational mode of enquiry. Walter Feinberg, a contemporary American educational philosopher 
who discusses social justice issues, also highlights the importance of the distinction between 
educational thought and political thought. Feinberg says: 
 
I believe that there is an important distinction between political democracy and educational 
democracy that can help us to sort out different kinds of claims regarding the responsibility 
of schools in promoting certain identities. This distinction is frequently overlooked by 
educators who wish to use education to advance a certain form of enlightened, democratic 
understanding and who believe that one can determine the right thing to do politically on 
the basis of deciding what the right thing to do is educationally. It is also overlooked by 
political theorists who hold that the right thing to do educationally can be deduced by 
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determining what the right thing to do is politically (Feinberg, 1998, p. 27).  
 
What, then, is the educational way of discussing social justice? Murai describes it using an example 
from Greek Mythology, Antigone (Murai, 1996a, p. 45). According to Murai, the story of Antigone 
teaches the issue of subjectivity in social justice and educational thought. In the story, social rules and 
laws are initially created for people living well. However, as time goes on, those laws and rules become 
a dead letter and an authority themselves. As a result of the confusion of subjectivity, rules lose their 
original purpose, that is, to promote human living. This is how the outcome of a creation intended to 
promote social justice can become unjust. Murai points out that the tragedy of Antigone provides a 
warning for contemporary education because the development of educational studies and schooling is 
not always consistent with social improvement. Rather, for him, it seems to be a cause of more 
problems in society (Murai, 1978, p. 58). For Murai, the foundational problem of Antigone is the 
confusion of subjectivity. And, it indicates Murai’s response to Standish’s argument. Murai would ask 
more explanation to Standish concerning how his examination of social justice can contribute to the 
development of the educational way of thinking as the subject of the discussion. 
 
 
GOODNESS AS HUMAN DISPOSITION 
  
I will now examine a way to integrate Imai’s and Standish’s arguments with Murai’s further 
educational discussion. Murai’s approach to Imai’s argument was to show that the distinction 
between education and indoctrination is fundamental in examining the relationship between 
education and violence. On the other hand, Murai’s argument toward Standish’s philosophical 
analysis was that the distinction between educational modes of thought and other ways of thinking, 
such as political or economic thought, should be the initial point of departure in examining the issue 
of social justice in educational studies. As described above, Murai responded differently to each 
thinker’s argument. However, the foundational question posed by these responses integrates all three 
thinkers. It is to ask why ‘one can scarcely imagine a form of human life for which justice does not 
remain a question’ (Standish, 2012, p. 17)? And, this question should be answered from an 
educational perspective.  
  To explore the question in an educational framework, Murai claims that it is necessary to discuss 
the matter of goodness as a human disposition. Here, Murai selects the term, ‘disposition’, as opposed 
to other possible terms in English such as ‘tendency’ or ‘nature’ (Murai, 2000, p. 238). Murai’s idea 
of the human disposition is that every single person is trying to live well. According to Murai, his idea 
of human disposition is not the view of human nature as fundamentally good, bad, or neutral as it 
has been discussed as a philosophical question since ancient Confucian philosophy as well as in Greek 
philosophy. Unlike traditional ways of understanding human nature as a noun, Murai tries to capture 
the human disposition as a continuously active verb, seeking for goodness.  
  Murai claims that this way of understanding the human disposition directly affects the definition 
of the term ‘education’. Murai defines education, or Kyouiku, as follows: 
 
All parents wish their children to become good. All adults wish young people to grow 
good…human beings have been sharing the same desire. Any activity supported by this desire is 
what we call ‘education’. We can say that, in a sense, the meaning of ‘education’ originates with 
the desire that human beings have for the goodness of young people. We also can say that the 
meaning of education will be with those human beings in the future (Murai, 1975, p. 2) 
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(Translation by the author).2  
 
Murai examines his own definition of education/kyouiku with reference to Israel Scheffler’s analysis of 
language. In The Language of Education, Scheffler categorizes varieties of definitions of education such 
as stipulative definitions, descriptive definitions, and programmatic definitions (Scheffler, 1960). 
Murai, however, contends that his definition of education/kyouiku is categorized by none of those. 
Instead, Murai calls his definition of education a ‘generative definition’, or Hasseiteki Teigi. This is 
because his definition of education is trying to describe the universal conditions that explain why 
education as a movement has been created among human beings (Murai, 2005, p. 53). In addition, 
like the definition of human disposition, Murai’s definition of education is as a continuously active 
verb (Murai, 2011, pp. 10-11). This is important for Murai because the issue of goodness is not 
whether or not people can acquire it(as it is when considered as a noun or some type of abstract 
possession). For Murai, goodness consists in the fact that people are endlessly seeking for goodness to 
cultivate themselves until the end of their lives. Therefore, for Murai, the discussion of social justice in 
education should be examined concurrently with the matter of goodness as the human disposition 
(Murai, 1996b, pp. 130-131). 
Here, Murai’s argument concerning goodness as the human disposition has a feature that allows it 
to engage with Standish’s argument concerning translation. Standish says: 
 
This dismissal then leads to the complacent assumption that this is just a matter of 
translation, that translation is primarily a technical matter, and that differences between 
languages are merely to be overcome…Think of this as a suppression of thought, of which 
the monolingual person may be unaware (Standish, 2012, p. 21).  
 
Standish points out that humanity should not be lost in the process of translation. Standish applies 
Stanley Cavell’s philosophical argument as a way to explore a solution: ‘I do not seek to shore up my 
own identity but rather am ready for new possibilities—that is, ready to become’ (p. 8). This 
acceptance of the ambiguity of the human disposition is analogous to Murai’s argument concerning 
educational thought. Murai claims that the idea that good education creates anxiety is not part of 
mainstream educational thought. For Murai, to understand ‘education’ as beautifully solving 
problems is to misunderstand the human disposition. Rather, according to a distinctively educational 
way of thinking, education always carries uncertainty and anxiety, because the human disposition is 
always seeking for goodness (Murai, 1978, p. 78).  Murai’s idea of goodness as human disposition 
can also share Imai’s concern over the issue of violence in education. Again, for Murai, human beings 
are endlessly in improvement. This idea does include the possibility of failures. It indicates that the 
line between indoctrination as violence and education as nonviolence is always extremely thin. It 
accepts that people sometimes make mistakes. This is an acceptable struggle for Murai because, for 
him, it is much more important to note that people have the potential to reflect on themselves, for 
example, to wonder if they make mistakes because they are seeking to be good.  
Murai addresses the complexity of goodness in terms of the difficulty of translating ‘goodness’ 
between English and Japanese. ‘Goodness’ in English is usually translated as yosa in Japanese. 
However, yosa in Japanese not only includes various meanings, but also carries various Chinese letters. 
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淑人乃 良跡吉見而 好常言師 芳野吉見与 良人四来三 
(Yoki hito no／Yoshi to yoku mite／Yoshi to ihishi／Yoshino yoku miyo／Yoki hito 
yokumitsu) (Nakanishi, 1978, p. 62) 
 
Good men from the past／took a good look saying what a good place it was.／Take a 
good look at Yoshino, the good field／which they declared to be good!／The good men of 
nowadays should take a good look (Marra, 2010, p. 26).3 
 
In the original Japanese poem, yoshi is phonetically repeated eight times. But yoshi is literally expressed 
with six different Chinese characters and they all have different meanings. However, in the English 
translation of the poem, all eight yoshi are translated as ‘good’. Michael F. Marra explains the 
complexity of the notion of goodness in the poem. He says: 
 
[T] he term ‘Yoshi’ 好シ (good), pointing at something which is likable because of either 
its ethical goodness or physical appeal…‘Yoshi’, however is a very ambiguous term with a 
variety of meanings: good (as opposed to evil), skilled, healthy, intelligent, effective, noble, 
prosperous, pleasant, friendly, profitable, valuable, auspicious, happy, etc. A famous 
tongue-twister from the Man’yoshu plays on a variety of meanings of the adjective ‘Yoshi,’ 
conjugated in a variety of ways. It is a homage to the beautiful landscape of the Yoshino 
mountains, whose name—‘the Fair Field’—incorporates the adjective ‘good, fair, beautiful, 
attractive’ (Yoshi) (Marra, 2010, p. 26).  
 
Murai intends to express goodness as a human disposition in the same way as it is used in this poem. 
He wishes to address a struggle to capture the meaning. It is impossible to apply any linguistic 
techniques to articulate goodness because goodness has various meanings and changes its meaning 
according to different perspectives and to moral, cultural, and religious contexts (Murai, 2005, p. 93). 
If we attempt to simplify the meaning by proclaiming what goodness is, or by replacing it with 
something else as an essence of goodness, we will only lose the quality of goodness from the word 
itself (Murai, 1994, pp. 182, 184, 187). 
  Here, Murai’s understanding of educational thought requires audiences to change their default way 
of dealing with educational issues, because the human disposition that is subject to educational ideas 
is more complex than current thinking allows. This entails that educational studies has a double role. 
First, educational research may have a role as a specialized area of another field, for example 
‘educational psychology’. This type of sub-specialized field is the mainstream paradigm of educational 
research in the contemporary academic world. Second, the role of educational studies is to engage 
educational thought itself. Any educational research should be examined on the basis of how it 
contributes to the development of the educational way of thinking.  
  If we take into account the complicated nature of education, we may be able to find a further 
possibility of interaction between Imai’s and Standish’s arguments. However, it is demanding for 
audiences to keep shouldering this sense of the intricateness of education. Audiences are especially at 
risk to lose the key point, which is to be aware of education’s ambiguous foundations when they need 
to understand varieties of profound thoughts. This suggests that if audiences lose their grip on the 
subject of educational thought under consideration, they would be under the illusion that Standish’s 
and Imai’s discussions depart from each other. As a result, they may even lose elements of their own 
subjectivities as audiences. Murai’s philosophical perspective helps those audiences to recover their 
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own subjectivity. His argument can do so because he consistently reclaims the educational thought. 
In other words, Murai’s contribution to the conversation echoes a phrase from the French Opera, 





In this article, in response to the lectures given by Standish and Imai, I have explored an intersection 
between their philosophical arguments about social justice. By creating an imaginary conversation 
between Imai and Murai, and between Standish and Murai, the foundational philosophical issue 
shared by all three thinkers has been clarified. This was the question of why human beings care for 
social justice and the discussion of these issues in relation to education. By sharing a philosophical 
foundation̶ ‘for the sake of educational thought’̶at the macro level, these three thinkers 
distinctively explore their disagreements at the micro level. Standish developed a position on the 
nature of translation between languages and cultures. Imai provided what he considered to be a better 
understanding of the relationship between violence, education, and justice. To integrate these two 
thinkers’ ideas, Murai explored the distinctively educational way of thinking by applying 
philosophical concepts. The conversation between Murai, Standish, and Imai teaches us that it is 
important for philosophers to continuously communicate with other thinkers as well as their broader 
audiences when outlining their thoughts. Furthermore, the conversation shows us the responsibility 






1. Murai repeatedly discusses the issue of the establishment of educational thought in his works. For example, 
see: Murai, 1994, p. 36. 
2. See: Murai, 2005, p. 53. Murai reflects on the background of giving the definition of education. 
3. Marra introduces the poem as follows ‘Man’yoshu 1:27, by Emperor Tenmu (r. 673-686), who composed 
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